

Machine learning and effectiveness of financial education programs

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Financial education programs

- Households and entrepreneurs with **low financial literacy** make poor decisions → negative impact on both their financial welfare and that of the whole society
- The effectiveness of financial education programs **may be undermined by**: low participation, poor execution, suboptimal design or **inappropriate audience**. In this paper, we focus on the latter issue

This paper

- We study whether algorithms could improve the effectiveness of financial education programs, by **identifying ex-ante the most appropriate recipients** (i.e., those who need FE the most). Two steps:
 - 1 We exploit data gathered from a sample of individuals and devise an algorithm to identify appropriate recipients of FE programs
 - 2 We simulate a policy scenario. We apply the algorithm to a **new** group of individuals and:
 - individuate those who should be offered a financial education course (targeted individuals) and those who should not (not-targeted)
 - evaluate whether the effectiveness of a financial education course is different among these two groups

Data: The financial education campaign by Edufin Committee

- We use individual data from about **3,800 individuals** who participated to a financial education campaign run by Edufin Committee in 2021.
- Financial education was taught by means of three TV programs ("treatments"):
 - 1 TV-show L'Eredita
 - 2 soap opera Un posto al sole (UPAS)
 - 3 various media messages (Sofia)
- The campaign was paired by a **randomized experiment** (RCT) to assess its effectiveness: the sample was equally divided in four groups: T1 (UPAS), T2 (L'Eredita), T3 (Sofia), control group.

Data: The financial education campaign by Edufin Committee (cont.)


- All four groups of individuals were administered a questionnaire before the treatment (pre-test) and a questionnaire after the treatment (post-test)
 - The questionnaires included a series of questions on financial topics, as well as a section on individual characteristics
- Treated individuals' compliance to the RCT was assessed by asking them few questions after each TV-episode
- To incentivize individuals to participate to the RCT, a small monetary prize was provided

By the way...



Training vs hold-out sample

Sample **conditionally random** split: training and hold-out




Notes: units.

Financial education targeting algorithm (machine learning)

- We use **training sample's pre-test data only** (i.e. red parts of the above fig.)
- Set up an algorithm that predicts individuals who **fail at least two** out of four questions about topics covered by UPAS
- We employ machine learning (ML) tools (trees, RF), with the set of predictors being **easily observable** variables:

sex	age	q3_1 no. children	q3_2 no. adults
q2_1–q2_6	civil status	q4_1–q4_7	occupational status
q5_1	level of education	q5_gen	parents' level of education
q24_1	bank account	q24_other	other financial instruments
q6	income band	q7_1–q7_4	area

The ML-based targeting rule (ML: tree)



zoom

Policy scenario simulation

- We apply the ML algorithm-based rule to a new set of individuals (i.e., "blue" guys)
- Very importantly, for such individuals we observe their financial literacy (measured by means of the two questionnaires) both before and after the financial education campaign
- We estimate the impact of the financial education campaign and assess whether it is different between target and not-target individuals

Treated vs Control individuals

- Despite the monetary prize, individuals assigned to treatment (i.e., watch UPAS) could fail to comply (cheating...)
- To tackle this problem we exploit data on which TV-programs people usually watch (including UPAS)
- **Treated individuals:** assigned to "watch UPAS" group & claim to usually watch UPAS (stricter def: & correctly answers most "check" questions)
- **Control individuals:** assigned to control group & claim not to usually watch UPAS

Baseline results

	Full sample	ML: Random forest	
		target	not target
panel (a): $y = \text{binary (improvement) indicator}$			
Type I treated	0.0709 (0.0527)	0.135* (0.0713)	-0.0206 (0.0744)
Observations	602	302	300
Type II treated	0.0917 (0.0638)	0.170* (0.0868)	-0.00986 (0.0899)
Observations	562	280	282
panel (b): $y = \text{pre-post score difference}$			
Type I treated	0.0802 (0.244)	0.551* (0.333)	-0.545 (0.338)
Observations	602	302	300
Type II treated	0.311 (0.295)	0.901** (0.405)	-0.415 (0.405)
Observations	562	280	282

Notes: Holdout sample. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Robustness 1: crrls

	Full sample	ML: Random forest	
		target	not target
panel (a): y = binary (improvement) indicator			
VARIABLES		target	not target
Type I treated	0.0777* (0.0456)	0.137** (0.0613)	0.0254 (0.0716)
Observations	602	302	300
Type II treated	0.0632 (0.0560)	0.142* (0.0751)	0.0252 (0.0877)
Observations	562	280	282
panel (b): y = pre-post score difference			
Type I treated	0.141 (0.197)	0.607** (0.270)	-0.323 (0.294)
Observations	602	302	300
Type II treated	0.184 (0.233)	0.724** (0.324)	-0.255 (0.334)
Observations	562	280	282
Notes: Holdout sample. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. (1) control variables included: see Table 9			

Additional exercises

- 1 Repeat estimates of 100 different training vs hold-out sample splits

figure

- 2 Falsification test


- 3 Balancing tests

Conclusions

- 1 We show that ML-based targeting can improve the effectiveness of a financial education campaign by helping identify ex-ante the most appropriate recipients
- 2 This approach can be widely applied. ML targeting could apply as well to schools, teachers, students
- 3 Further issues: transparency & external validity

Thank you!

The ML-based targeting rule (ML: tree): zoom



Falsification test results

	Full sample		ML:		Full sample		ML:	
		target		not target		target		not target
	y = binary (improv.) indicator			y = pre-post score difference				
T. I treat.	-0.0147	-0.0142	-0.0317	0.0850	-0.0107	0.106		
	(0.0522)	(0.0728)	(0.0719)	(0.235)	(0.293)	(0.365)		
Obs.	602	302	300	602	302	300		
T. II treat.	0.0528	0.126	-0.0424	0.429	0.578	0.190		
	(0.0639)	(0.0851)	(0.0858)	(0.293)	(0.354)	(0.446)		
Obs.	562	280	282	562	280	282		

Notes: Holdout sample. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

100 different training vs hold-out sample splits. Results




Figure 13: Treatment effect estimates (type I treated) for target and non target groups

Notes: Distribution of beta estimated on 100 random training vs holdout samples.

Balancing test: type I treated, ML-target

Table 9: ML-targeted individuals in the holdout sample: type I treated, treated vs control balancing tests

	treated		control		diff. of means	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	p
score_pre	2.528	1.695	2.531	1.659	0.003	(0.988)
big_3_mistakes	0.167	0.375	0.199	0.400	0.033	(0.523)
female	0.625	0.488	0.551	0.498	-0.074	(0.258)
older	0.472	0.503	0.352	0.478	-0.121	(0.072)
graduate	0.167	0.375	0.180	0.385	0.013	(0.796)
perm_empl	0.375	0.488	0.309	0.463	-0.066	(0.304)
low_income	0.264	0.444	0.270	0.445	0.006	(0.924)
fl_autopere_low	0.486	0.503	0.516	0.501	0.030	(0.661)
married	0.639	0.484	0.555	0.498	-0.084	(0.197)
family_memb_lt18	0.542	0.502	0.555	0.498	0.013	(0.846)
south_islands	0.403	0.494	0.375	0.485	-0.028	(0.673)
part_fe_courses	0.278	0.451	0.211	0.409	-0.067	(0.260)
make_ends_meet_diff	0.528	0.503	0.488	0.501	-0.039	(0.557)
info_web	0.458	0.502	0.512	0.501	0.053	(0.427)
info_fin_web	0.361	0.484	0.414	0.494	0.053	(0.416)
newspapers	0.431	0.499	0.324	0.469	-0.106	(0.108)
Observations	72		256		328	

Notes: Holdout sample, ML-targeted individuals. t-tests on the equality of means for treated and control individuals, assuming unequal variances. Variables are described in Table 2. Type I treated individuals are considered. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, + $p < 0.05$.

Balancing test: type I treated, not ML-target

Table 10: Not ML-targeted individuals in the holdout sample: type I treated, treated vs control balancing tests

	treated		control		diff. of means	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	p
score_pre	3.789	1.094	3.644	1.288	-0.145	(0.462)
big_3_mistakes	0.105	0.311	0.076	0.266	-0.029	(0.589)
female	0.553	0.504	0.534	0.500	-0.019	(0.832)
older	0.421	0.500	0.424	0.495	0.003	(0.976)
graduate	0.579	0.500	0.547	0.499	-0.032	(0.713)
perm_empl	0.474	0.506	0.479	0.501	0.005	(0.954)
low_income	0.053	0.226	0.064	0.244	0.011	(0.786)
fl_autoperc_low	0.211	0.413	0.263	0.441	0.052	(0.477)
married	0.737	0.446	0.623	0.486	-0.114	(0.155)
family_memb_lt18	0.447	0.504	0.534	0.500	0.087	(0.330)
south_islands	0.368	0.489	0.369	0.483	0.000	(0.998)
part_fc_courses	0.395	0.495	0.398	0.491	0.004	(0.967)
make_ends_meet_diff	0.211	0.413	0.25	0.434	0.039	(0.590)
info_web	0.605	0.495	0.746	0.436	0.140	(0.106)
info_fin_web	0.658	0.481	0.657	0.476	-0.001	(0.989)
newspapers	0.605	0.495	0.445	0.498	-0.160	(0.070)
Observations	38		236		274	

Notes: Holdout sample, not ML-targeted individuals. t-tests on the equality of means for treated and control individuals, assuming unequal variances. Variables are described in Table

2. Type I treated individuals are considered. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Balancing test: type II treated, ML-target

Table 11: ML-targeted individuals in the holdout sample: type II treated, treated vs control balancing tests

	treated		control		diff. of means	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	p
score_pre	2.283	1.772	2.531	1.659	0.249	(0.380)
big_3_mistakes	0.174	0.383	0.199	0.400	0.025	(0.684)
female	0.674	0.474	0.551	0.498	-0.123	(0.112)
older	0.413	0.498	0.352	0.478	-0.061	(0.441)
graduate	0.196	0.401	0.18	0.385	-0.016	(0.803)
perm_empl	0.283	0.455	0.309	0.463	0.026	(0.723)
low_income	0.304	0.465	0.27	0.445	-0.035	(0.640)
fl_autoperc_low	0.522	0.505	0.516	0.501	-0.006	(0.940)
married	0.674	0.474	0.555	0.498	-0.119	(0.124)
family_memb_lt18	0.500	0.506	0.555	0.498	0.055	(0.501)
south_islands	0.326	0.474	0.375	0.485	0.049	(0.523)
part_fe_courses	0.261	0.444	0.211	0.409	-0.05	(0.480)
make_ends_meet_diff	0.543	0.504	0.488	0.501	-0.055	(0.496)
info_web	0.478	0.505	0.512	0.501	0.033	(0.680)
info_fin_web	0.348	0.482	0.414	0.494	0.066	(0.395)
newspapers	0.478	0.505	0.324	0.469	-0.154	(0.059)
Observations	46		256		302	

Notes: Holdout sample, ML-targeted individuals. *t*-tests on the equality of means for treated and control individuals, assuming unequal variances. Variables are described in Table 2. Type II treated individuals are considered. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Balancing test: type II treated, not ML-target

Table 12: Not ML-targeted individuals in the holdout sample: type II treated, treated vs control balancing tests

	treated		control		diff. of means	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	b	p
score_pre	3.708	1.197	3.644	1.288	-0.064	(0.805)
big_3_mistakes	0.125	0.338	0.076	0.266	-0.049	(0.499)
female	0.417	0.504	0.534	0.500	0.117	(0.286)
older	0.417	0.504	0.424	0.495	0.007	(0.948)
graduate	0.625	0.495	0.547	0.499	-0.078	(0.466)
perm_empl	0.500	0.511	0.479	0.501	-0.021	(0.848)
low_income	0.042	0.204	0.064	0.244	0.022	(0.627)
fl_autoperc_low	0.292	0.464	0.263	0.441	-0.029	(0.772)
married	0.708	0.464	0.623	0.486	-0.085	(0.400)
family_memb_lt18	0.417	0.504	0.534	0.500	0.117	(0.286)
south_islands	0.542	0.509	0.369	0.483	-0.173	(0.122)
part_fe_courses	0.417	0.504	0.398	0.491	-0.018	(0.866)
make_ends_meet_diff	0.250	0.442	0.25	0.434	0.000	(1.00)
info_web	0.667	0.482	0.746	0.436	0.079	(0.446)
info_fin_web	0.708	0.464	0.657	0.476	-0.052	(0.609)
newspapers	0.542	0.509	0.445	0.498	-0.097	(0.382)
Observations	24		236		260	

Notes: Holdout sample, not ML-targeted individuals. t-tests on the equality of means for treated and control individuals, assuming unequal variances. Variables are described in Table 2. Type II treated individuals are considered. *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$